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Abstract
We investigate whether public and private sector employees differ in terms of public
service motivation using a representative sample of elderly workers from 12 European
countries. We find that public sector workers, both those currently employed and those
already retired, are significantly more prosocial; however, the difference in prosociality
is explained by differences in the composition of the workforce across the two sectors,
in terms of (former) workers’ education and occupation. Subsample analysis reveals
that public sector former workers in education are more prosocial even after
controlling for a rich set of characteristics.
JEL codes: D64; H83; J45
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“Wall Street may be losing its luster for new U.S. college graduates who are
increasingly looking to the government for jobs that enrich their social conscience, if
not their wallet.”
Wendell Marsh, Reuters, 11/06/2009.
1 Introduction
In most countries the public sector is a key economic actor, providing a wide range of
goods and services, regulating the economic activities of firms and households, and redis-
tributing large shares of national income through the tax and benefit system. To execute
all these functions, the public sector employs a large fraction of the labor force: on aver-
age, government employment represents 15% of the labor force across the OECD, with
compensation of government employees reaching 11% of GDP (OECD 2011). Employees
in the public sector operate in an environment where agency problems are arguably more
severe than in the private sector (Dixit 2002; Besley and Ghatak 2003) due, for instance,
to the multiplicity of objectives and principals characterizing public sector organizations
and the difficulty in measuring output, which can give rise to phenomena such as corrup-
tion (Svensson 2005), regulatory capture (Dal Bo 2006), and waste (Bandiera et al. 2009).
For these reasons, and given the importance of the tasks carried out in the public sector
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(e.g. education, health care, law enforcement), understanding what are the characteris-
tics of public sector employees is of primary importance. In particular, whether or not
public sector workers are intrinsically motivated to carry out their job in order to serve
the public interest, i.e., they have public service motivation, is important, for instance, for
the design of remuneration policies (Besley and Ghatak 2005; Delfgaauw and Dur 2008;
Dal Bo et al. 2013) and the outsourcing of public service provision to for-profit firms
(Francois 2000; Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008)1. The issue of selection of workers into
the public sector has also recently received a lot of attention in the development literature
(Dal Bo et al. 2013; Hanna and Wang 2013; Banuri and Keefer 2013; Lagarde and Blaauw
2013; Ashraf et al. 2014).
In this paper, we assess whether the public sector is effective in attracting a particu-
larly motivated workforce by comparing private and public sector workers, current and
retired, along one aspect of prosocial behavior, namely, volunteering2. We draw data from
the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), a representative cross-
national survey of more than 85,000 individuals from 19 European countries aged 50 or
over, with detailed information about health, socio-economic status and social and fam-
ily networks. An important advantage of this dataset is that it allows us to compare not
only current public and private sector employees but also retired workers from the two
sectors. Moreover, we are able to follow a subsample of individuals who transition from
employment into retirement and thus track how their behavior develops.
Looking at elderly workers and retirees, beyond being interesting in its own right
because of ageing, represents the main methodological contribution of this paper. In
what follows, we underline the advantages of using this demographic to identify public
service motivation among public sector workers, while in the conclusions, we elabo-
rate on some of its limitations. The first advantage of focusing on elderly workers is
related to the fact that the early years of someone’s career may not be very reveal-
ing in terms of tastes, as one may engage in “job hopping” in search of a good match
(Jovanovic 1979). This problem is exacerbated if there is “queuing” for public sector jobs,
as is common in many countries. Considering the latter part of one’s career provides
a better indication of preferences and, as the average job tenure in our sample of cur-
rent employees is 21 years (while retirees have spent, on average, 25 years in their last
job), we capture a sizeable part of the working life. Secondly, looking at retirees allows
us to overcome two potential limitations associated with drawing inferences from sam-
ples of current workers, as the existing literature has done. The first is that the working
environment is likely to be different between the private and public sectors in terms of
working hours, job security, career incentives, required effort and so on, and it is dif-
ficult to control for all these differences. Thus, differences between current public and
private sector employees may be due to (uncontrolled for) differences in the working
environment rather than to differences in motivation. This is not an issue for retirees.
The second limitation of comparing only current employees is that marginal and overall
motivation may differ. Finding that, for instance, plumbers donate to charity more than
nurses would indicate that their prosocial motivation is higher on the margin, but we
could not infer how they compare in terms of overall motivation. Nurses may donate less
because they have the opportunity to behave altruistically on the job and thusmay feel less
inclined to do it off the job. Of course, considerations about past contributions to soci-
ety may play a role in the decision on whether or not to behave prosocially when retired,
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but we expect these to be of second order importance compared to contemporaneous
events.
What we find is that public sector workers are more prosocially inclined as they are
more likely to volunteer compared to private sector workers. In particular, working in the
public sector increases the probability of volunteering by 3 percentage points compared
to an average propensity to volunteer of 16%. We also find that this difference in proso-
cial attitudes is mostly due to the composition of the public sector workforce. Indeed,
once we control for factors like education and profession, there is no significant difference
in the prosocial behavior of public and private sector employees. The results are similar
when looking at retirees. In that sample, the unconditional difference is higher, 6%, but is
considerably reduced and becomes insignificant after controlling for personal character-
istics. The longitudinal analysis, where we can control for individual fixed effects, reveals
a positive shift in volunteering after retirement, but no differential shift depending on the
sector of employment. This suggests that the two biases discussed above are either small
or cancel each other out.
Thus, overall our results indicate that public sector workers are, on average, more
prosocial than private sector workers, but this is mostly because they are, on average,
more educated and less likely to perform menial tasks, factors that are positively cor-
related with prosociality. In other words, our results suggest that it is the structural
difference of jobs in the public and private sector that explains the different prosocial
attitudes of workers in the two sectors, while we do not find evidence of public service
motivation that is specific to the public sector as a whole.
When we perform subgroup analysis on the more numerous sample of retirees, we
find that, while public sector workers in education display significantly more proso-
cial motivation than comparable workers in the private sector, this is not the case for
workers in health and social care, public administration and the rest of the public
sector. When we narrow the comparison within broadly defined occupational groups,
we do not find differences across the two sectors. For instance, we find that pri-
vate and public sector managers and professionals are indistinguishable in terms of
their prosocial motivation. We also find that public sector former workers with longer
tenure in their last job are more prosocial, but this difference is not significant after
controlling for personal characteristics. Finally, the pattern of findings regarding the
public-private difference in prosociality outlined above – a significant premium in
public sector in raw comparisons that vanishes when controlling for individual charac-
teristics – is robust to considering different cohorts of retirees or different countries
separately.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses more in detail
the relevant literature. Section 3 introduces the data and describes and provides sum-
mary statistics of the main variables. Section 4 presents the main results on differences in
prosocial motivation. Section 5 conducts some subgroup analysis by industry, occupation,
tenure, age group and country, while the last section concludes.
2 Related literature
Here, we briefly review the empirical literature concerning differences between public
and private sector employees in terms of prosocial motivation. In the conclusions, we
compare these findings to our results.
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Starting with studies that infer prosocial motivation from reported actions, Gregg
et al. (2011) use the British Household Panel Survey and focus on individuals work-
ing in health, education, and social care industries. They find that employees in the
non-profit sector are significantly more likely to do unpaid overtime than those in the
for-profit sector; looking at the behavior of people who switch sectors, they find some
supporting evidence that this is due to self-selection rather than to different institu-
tional norms in the two sectors. There is also a literature in political science and public
administration that explores empirically the issue of public sector motivation. Rotolo
and Wilson (2006) and Lee (2012) use the Current Population Survey and find that
public-sector workers are more likely to volunteer than private-sector ones. Brewer
(2003) uses the American National Election Study and finds that government employees
are more likely to participate in nonpolitical civic organizations and are more trust-
ful than other citizens. Houston (2006) uses the General Social Survey and finds that
public employees are more likely to volunteer and donate blood than private sector
employees.
The study by Buurman et al. (2012) exploits a survey that took place in the Netherlands
offering as a reward for completion a gift certificate, a lottery ticket, or a charitable dona-
tion. They look at whether public or private sector employees differ in their choices.What
they find is that public sector employees are significantly less likely to choose the lottery.
Moreover, public sector workers are more likely to choose the charity only at the start
of their career, while, as tenure increases, the difference disappears and even reverses.
By looking at whether people feel underpaid in their job, they also find some indication
that public sector employees might not donate to the charity because they feel they have
already contributed to society at work.
There are also several studies looking at reported motivations. Dur and Zoutenbier
(2012) and Cowley and Smith (2014) use data from the World Values Survey to explore
the importance of public sector mission in attracting motivated workers. The first paper
finds an increase in the likelihood of working in the public sector for those workers
who have both high altruism and confidence in political parties. The second paper
finds that public sector workers exhibit higher intrinsic motivation in many countries
and that the likelihood of intrinsically motivated workers to work in the public sec-
tor is negatively affected by corruption, with the effects being stronger for younger
workers. Dur and Zoutenbier (2012) and Dohmen and Falk (2010) use data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel Study. The first paper finds evidence of public sector
workers being more altruistic (and lazy) than similar private sector employees, with
the difference in altruism due to employees in caring industries and the difference in
laziness due to workers with long experience, while the difference in altruism is not
affected by experience. The second paper focuses on teachers and finds that they are
more risk averse, trust more and are less negatively reciprocal than employees in other
professions.
Recently, a series of papers in the development literature has looked at the issue of
worker selection into the public sector. Dal Bo et al. (2013) use a field experiment in
Mexico and find, among other things, that offering higher salaries at the recruitment stage
attracts candidates with stronger public service motivation. Ashraf et al. (2014) set up a
field experiment in Zambia and find that stressing the social dimension, rather than career
perspectives, of public sector jobs does not affect the motivation of candidates. Hanna
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andWang (2013) show evidence of negative selection into the public sector in India, with
students more likely to cheat during a laboratory experiment also more likely to express
a preference for a government job. Banuri and Keefer (2013), on the other hand, find evi-
dence of positive selection into public service in Indonesia. Lastly, Lagarde and Blaauw
(2013) report that nursing students in South Africa that displayed generous behavior in a
dictator game with patient recipients, were more likely to then take up positions in rural
areas, which are considered to be less desirable for health workers but more beneficial to
the beneficiaries.
Finally, looking at senior citizens has been instrumental in addressing various impor-
tant issues in economics. The SHARE dataset has been used, for instance, to look at
portfolio choices (Christelis et al. 2010; 2013), the effect of retirement on cognitive
abilities (Rohwedder and Willis 2010; Mazzonna and Peracchi 2012), the effects of edu-
cation on the distribution of earnings (Brunello et al. 2009), the long term economic
and health outcomes of exposure to war (Kesternich et al. 2012) and the prevalence of
informal caregiving to elderly parents (Crespo and Mira 2014). There have also been
studies, mostly in gerontology, describing the patterns of volunteering (see Hank and
Erlinghagen 2010, for a review) or other outcomes among elderly people. To the best
of our knowledge, this is, however, the first study looking at senior citizens, both work-
ing and retired, to uncover differences between the workforces in the public and private
sectors.
3 Data
3.1 The survey and samples
We use data from waves 1 (2004), 2 (2006), and 4 (2011) of the Survey of Health, Age-
ing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which collects data on health, socio-economic
status, social support and networks of a representative sample of individuals aged 50 and
above from 19 European countries (plus Israel). Extensive documentation about the sur-
vey can be found at http://www.share-project.org/3. We focus on 12 Western European
countries (Austria, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark,
Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, Portugal)4.
We form twomain samples: one of current employees and one of former employees who
are currently retired. In both cases we restrict attention to individuals aged between 50
and 80 who were born in the country they are interviewed and exclude the self-employed.
This leaves us with 12,165 observations for current employees and 19,486 observations
for retirees, for which we have information for the control variables as well. In SHARE,
some people are interviewed in multiple waves, but in creating the two main samples, we
use just one observation per individual. For the employees sample, we select the one cor-
responding to the last occasion in which we observe the individual as an employee, while
for the retirees sample, we select the first occasion in which we observe the individual as
a retiree. Finally, we also construct a longitudinal sample consisting of the 1,800 individ-
uals that we observe both as employees and as retirees. These individuals are in both the
main samples.
3.2 Key variables
The key variable we use in our empirical analysis is sector of employment. This
allows us to distinguish between private and public sector (former) employees. For
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the retirees sample, we derive the variable from the following two questions in the
survey:
1. “We are now going to talk about the last job you had. In this job were you an
employee or self-employed?” (Employee/ Civil servant/ Self-employed)
2. (If Employee) “In this job were you employed in the public sector?” (Yes/No)
For the employee sample, the questions are similar but refer to the current main job. We
classify as public sector employees those answering “Civil servant” to the first question or
“Employee” to the first question and “Yes” to the second question, and as private sector
employees those answering “No” to the second question. We do not know in which sec-
tor individuals in our sample started their career or whether they have switched sectors
during their working life. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the introduction, it may be prefer-
able to consider the latter part of someone’s working life, and in our sample, on average,
employees have spent 21 years in their current job and retirees 25 years in their last job.
Our main outcome variable is prosociality. We classify as being prosocial those answer-
ing positively to a question on whether they had done voluntary or charity work in the
last month5.
We also use information about other variables that may influence the likelihood of
engaging in voluntary work like gender, marital status, age, education, health status, set-
tlement type, household income, occupation, and participation in a sport, social, or other
kind of club6. For current employees, we also use information on characteristics of their
working life that may have an impact on the propensity to volunteer, like the hours worked
per week, whether they experience time pressure due to heavy workload, and whether
they consider their salary adequate.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the size of the two samples in each country,
ranging from 290 to 1551 individuals for employees and from 689 to 2814 for retirees, and
the proportion of each country after applying survey weights. There is also information
on the size of the public sector in terms of employment and the prevalence of prosocial
Table 1 Summary statistics
Country
Workers Retirees
Number Weighted Public Prosocial (%) Number Weighted Public Prosocial (%)
of obs. proportion sector (%) of obs. proportion sector (%)
Austria 902 1.9 41.3 15.2 2814 3.3 33.3 13.9
Germany 887 33.0 28.3 15.4 1522 25.0 26.9 15.2
Sweden 1232 4.3 51.5 15.8 1717 2.7 53.7 20.8
Netherlands 1242 5.8 53.6 28.2 1447 3.9 51.5 31.7
Spain 758 10.9 39.0 6.8 1276 12.0 23.0 4.0
Italy 818 15.0 44.8 12.4 1965 24.4 32.6 13.1
France 1463 18.8 38.5 19.6 2465 17.7 38.6 22.0
Denmark 1369 2.5 50.4 23.4 1229 1.8 51.1 22.4
Greece 495 1.3 45.4 3.5 689 1.5 38.8 3.2
Switzerland 1158 2.5 39.3 22.5 1168 2.0 38.9 22.7
Belgium 1551 3.0 42.3 18.4 2382 3.7 40.3 23.8
Portugal 290 1.1 44.6 5.3 812 2.1 43.3 6.8
Total 12,165 100.0 38.2 15.8 19,486 100.0 33.5 15.5
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motivation, separately for each of the 12 countries in our sample. The public sector is
substantial in size in the sample, averaging 38% in the employees sample and 34% in the
retirees sample. The average measure of prosociality is around 16% in both samples, with
significant variation across countries. The overall pattern is for countries in the South
(Greece, Spain and Portugal) to score low on this measure and countries in Central and
Northern Europe to display larger incidence of volunteering.
Table 2 reports means of our measure of prosociality for the whole population and
across the two sectors as well as the demographic, socio-economic and health character-
istics we use as controls in the regression analysis below. In terms of a rough comparison
across sectors, the prevalence of prosocial motivation is higher among public sector cur-
rent or former employees. Something to notice here, however, is that in both samples,
individuals that retire from the private and public sector differ along important dimen-
sions, most notably education and profession. In particular, there is a larger concentration
of public sector workers who have completed some level of tertiary education, as com-
pared to workers in the private sector, where there is a larger concentration of workers
who have just completed primary education. With regards to occupation, again we see
some marked differences across the two sectors that reflect the structural difference
between what is produced in the two sectors. The public sector employs a higher propor-
tion of white collar workers (managers, professionals, and clerks), while the private sector
has a larger concentration of blue collar workers, both skilled and unskilled, and work-
ers performing elementary jobs7. Comparing workers to retirees, it is not surprising that
retirees are, on average, older and report experiencing health issues more frequently than
current workers. Moreover, their household income is lower. It is also possible to notice
that workers achieve a higher educational level compared to retirees, consistent with a
secular increase in schooling. In line with this, the distribution of occupations for workers
is skewed towards more skilled jobs compared to retirees.
4 Main results
Our main analysis involves estimating logit regressions of the following form:
Prosociali = α + βPublici + X′iδ + μc + st + i, (1)
where Prosociali is a binary variable indicating whether individual i has done any volun-
tary work, Publici is a binary variable indicating whether an individual’s current job is in
the public sector or, for retirees, whether the last job before retirement was in the public
sector, Xi includes a set of individual socio-economic, demographic, job and health char-
acteristics that we control for (summarized in Table 2),μc are country dummies, and st are
survey wave dummies. We use survey weights throughout and report average marginal
effects and the associated standard errors obtained by using the delta method8.
4.1 Baseline results
Table 3 reports our baseline estimates of Equation 1, with and without controls. Look-
ing first at the sample of workers, we find that the marginal effect of being employed
in the public sector on the probability of undertaking voluntary work is 3.3% and is
statistically significant. For retirees, the corresponding figure is 6.3%, again statistically
significant9. We saw earlier in Table 1 that on average the probability of voluntary activity
in both samples is 16%, so these figures indicate a rather large effect. However, when we
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Table 2 Demographic, socio-economic and health characteristics
Workers Retirees
All Private Public All Private Public
Prosocial (%) 15.8 14.4 18.0 15.5 12.8 20.9
Age
Mean 56.5 56.4 56.6 67.7 68.1 66.9
Gender
% Female 45.0 41.4 49.3 46.1 45.6 47.0
Couple (%) 74.1 74.4 73.7 68.4 67.5 70.1
Education (%)
No schooling 1.3 1.4 1.0 5.0 6.6 1.9
Primary education 8.3 9.9 5.6 26.4 30.8 17.5
Lower secondary 15.2 17.4 11.7 17.6 18.6 15.8
Upper secondary 40.5 45.6 32.1 32.2 32.5 31.6
Post-secondary non-tertiary 3.9 3.6 4.5 1.8 1.3 3.0
First stage of tertiary 29.5 21.4 42.6 15.8 9.5 28.3
Second stage of tertiary education 1.2 0.6 2.2 0.6 0.2 1.4
Still in school 0.1 0.2 0.1
Other 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5
Limited activities (%)
Severely limited 6.9 7.7 5.7 12.9 13.1 12.5
Limited, but not severely 21.5 21.9 20.8 30.6 32.1 27.8
Not limited 71.6 70.4 73.5 56.5 54.8 59.8
Income
Mean 40.2 38.4 43.2 30.8 28.2 35.9
Location (%)
A big city 14.6 15.1 13.8 13.1 12.8 13.8
The suburbs 14.1 13.2 15.6 13.2 12.5 14.7
A large town 13.8 12.5 16.1 13.2 12.2 15.3
A small town 23.3 24.3 21.6 26.5 27.4 24.6
Rural area or village 25.1 26.2 23.3 26.1 27.2 24.0
Missing 9.0 8.7 9.6 7.9 8.0 7.7
Occupation (%)
Legislator, senior official or manager 9.9 7.8 13.4 7.1 5.5 10.2
Professional 13.6 6.6 25.1 8.8 3.5 19.4
Technician or associate professional 15.9 14.8 17.8 13.4 11.4 17.4
Clerk 17.4 16.9 18.4 15.9 14.6 18.5
Service worker and shop and market sale 14.8 16.6 11.9 11.4 11.2 11.9
Skilled agricultural or fishery worker 1.5 2.0 0.7 3.6 4.9 1.0
Craft and related trades worker 9.9 14.6 2.4 12.3 16.3 4.3
Plant and machine operator or assembler 7.1 10.2 1.9 9.8 12.3 4.7
Elementary occupation 9.5 10.5 7.9 17.0 20.3 10.6
Armed forces 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.8 0.0 2.2
Hours worked per week 35.8 36.2 35.1
Time pressure due to heavy workload
Strongly agree 17.2 18.0 15.9
Agree 34.3 34.9 33.2
Disagree 35.8 34.4 37.9
Strongly disagree 12.8 12.6 13.0
Job salary adequate
Strongly agree 10.2 10.5 9.7
Agree 45.7 45.5 46.0
Disagree 32.2 31.8 32.8
Strongly disagree 12.0 12.2 11.6
Club (%) 28.7 27.4 31.0 21.9 20.1 25.50
For workers, there are statistically significant differences across the two sectors in all of the characteristics, with the
exception of age, couple, limited activities, time pressure and job salary adequate. For retirees, the only exception is gender.
Income is in 1,000 euros 2007 Germany PPP.
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Table 3 Cross country logit regressions - marginal effects
Workers Retirees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public 0.033** 0.002 0.063*** 0.013
Male 0.032** -0.004
Couple -0.001 -0.001
Age 0.000 -0.002**
Education
Primary education -0.003 -0.003
Lower secondary 0.023 0.050*
Upper secondary 0.017 0.037
Post-secondary non-tertiary 0.134* 0.111***
First stage of tertiary 0.070 0.083***
Second stage of tertiary education 0.064 0.065
Still in school 0 -0.104***
Other -0.013 0.096*
Limited Activities
Limited, but not severely -0.014 0.037***
Not limited 0.003 0.047***
Location
The suburbs 0.013 -0.029
A large town 0.048* -0.013
A small town 0.050** 0.002
Rural area or village 0.069*** -0.001
Missing 0.019 -0.026
Income 0.000 0.000
Occupation
Professional 0.022 0.003
Technician or associate professional -0.001 -0.012
Clerk -0.028 -0.029
Service worker and shop and market sale -0.021 -0.034*
Skilled agricultural or fishery worker -0.045 -0.123***
Craft and related trades worker -0.059 -0.084***
Plant and machine operator or assembler -0.079** -0.060***
Elementary occupation -0.040 -0.066***
Armed forces -0.071 0.052
Hours Worked per Week -0.001*
Time Pressure due to Heavy Workload
Agree 0.015
Disagree 0.012
Strongly disagree -0.012
Job Salary Adequate
Agree 0.002
Disagree -0.014
Strongly disagree 0.025
Club 0.101*** 0.11***
N 12165 12165 19486 19486
Notes: Regressions include country and survey wave dummies.
*** [**] (*) denote significance at 1, [5], (10) % level.
Omitted categories are: education (none), limited activities (severely limited), type of settlement (big city), occupation
(Managers).
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account for the various individual controls, the marginal effect of public sector experience
drops in the two samples to 0.2% and 1.3%, respectively, and is in both cases statistically
insignificant.
Regarding the marginal effects of the other covariates in the estimated regression, we
see some evidence that among retirees, more educated individuals and those who do
not suffer from health problems that limit their activities are significantly more likely
to volunteer. Among the various occupations, there is evidence of a negative associa-
tion between the propensity to volunteer and jobs in agriculture, crafts and trade, and
elementary occupations. In the employees sample, gender and location seem to matter,
with males and those living in smaller communities more likely to volunteer. Note that to
account for possible differences in the availability of time or general propensity to have an
active life, we also have a control for whether an individual reports having gone to a sport,
social or other kind of club, and in both samples, we find a strong, positive association
between voluntary work and engagement in this other type of social activity.
Summarizing, at first look, it appears that while individuals in the public sector aremore
prosocial, this difference is explained by personal characteristics. Once these differences
in the composition of the respective workforces are accounted for, we find no evidence
of any residual difference in prosociality between workers in the two sectors. In other
words, we find no evidence of prosocial motivation that is specific to having a public-
sector employer. This is true both when looking at current employees and at retirees.
4.2 Analysis of explanatory power of characteristics
In this section, we investigate which of the characteristics that we control for in the
baseline regressions reported above are primarily responsible for the reduction of the
public-private gap in volunteering that we see in Table 3. Our approach is to reestimate
Equation 1 including only one (or two) additional characteristics as control(s) at a time.
The outcome of this analysis is summarized in Table 4 for the sample of employees, which
reports the marginal effect of having public sector experience, with each column of the
table indicating the control variable included in the regression. What this analysis sug-
gests is that only two characteristics, education (column 4) and occupation (column 8),
have a substantial impact on the magnitude of the public sector marginal effect, reducing
it to a value close to zero and rendering it statistically insignificant.
In Table 5, we report the results for the sample of retirees, controlling in this case also for
combinations of two variables. In particular, the diagonal terms of the table correspond
to regressions with one additional control, while the off diagonal terms contain marginal
effects of regressions with combinations of controls indicated by the corresponding row
and column heading. Focusing first on the diagonal terms, what this analysis suggests is
Table 4 Cross country logit regressions - marginal effects - workers
Male Couple Age Education Limited activities Location Income Occupation Club Job char.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
0.036** 0.033** 0.034** 0.011 0.033** 0.034** 0.031* 0.007 0.029* 0.033**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Notes: The heading of each row indicate the control variable used in the regression. All columns include country and survey
wave dummies.
In all columns, the number of observations is 12,165.
The entries are average marginal effects standard errors are reported in parentheses.
**(*) denote significance at 5, (10) % level.
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Table 5 Cross country logit regressions - marginal effects - retirees
Male Couple Age Education Limited activities Location Income Occupation Club
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Male 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.031*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.023** 0.057***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Couple 0.062*** 0.058*** 0.030*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.021** 0.056***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Age 0.058*** 0.030*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.020** 0.053***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Education 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.014 0.028***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Limited 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.021** 0.055***
activities
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Location 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.021** 0.056***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Income 0.059*** 0.021** 0.053***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Occupation 0.021** 0.020**
(0.009) (0.009)
Club 0.056***
(0.010)
Notes: The heading(s) of each row and column indicate(s) the control variable(s) used in the regression. All columns include
country and survey wave dummies.
In all columns, the number of observations is 19,486.
The entries are average marginal effects; standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** (**) denote significance at 1, (5) % level.
that, again, only two characteristics, education (column 4) and occupation (column 8),
have a substantial impact on the magnitude of the public sector marginal effect, reduc-
ing it by more than half. The rest of the individual characteristics on their own, including
health status and club participation, have no noticeable impact on the magnitude and sig-
nificance of the marginal effect of the public sector dummy compared to what we obtain
in the unconditional regression in Table 3. Turning attention to the off diagonal terms,
we find that when we introduce characteristics in pairs, the public-private difference in
the likelihood of volunteering is reduced only when either education or occupation is
present and that no other characteristic is able to further reduce the marginal effect when
combined with either of these two controls. Finally, when we introduce education and
occupation simultaneously, the marginal effect shrinks to 1.4% and is statistically insignif-
icant (row 4, column 8), thus closely resembling the outcome in Table 3 when including
all controls.
These results indicate that the estimated raw difference in prosocial activity across indi-
viduals from the private and public sector is not due to differences in time availability or
health status, but rather to the fact that the public sector employs more educated people
to perform more white collar jobs than the private sector, and these characteristics are
positively correlated with the likelihood of engaging in prosocial activities.
4.3 Longitudinal sample
In this section, we exploit the panel structure of the survey to form a subsample of 1,800
individuals that we can observe both in the work and retirement stage. By focusing on this
group, that we refer to as the longitudinal sample, we are able to gain further insight as to
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whether the similarity we see in the results in Table 3 between the two cross-sections of
workers and retirees is genuine and is not due to a cohort or other effect. We first check
whether this subsample is similar to the baseline sample of workers and retirees in terms
of the public/private difference in prosociality. Reassuringly, in unreported regressions,
we find the same pattern, both when they are working and when they are retired, as in the
baseline samples, that is, there is a significant public sector premium, which disappears
once we control for education and occupation.
We then pool the data and estimate a linear probability model of the likelihood of vol-
unteering on dummy variables for whether an individual is or has been employed in the
public sector and on whether he is retired, plus the interaction of the two. The results of
this estimation are reported in column (1) of Table 6. We see that the likelihood of volun-
teering for workers in the private sector is 14.1% in this subsample, in line with the overall
tendency we reported in Table 2.Workers in the public sector are significantly more likely
to volunteer by 4.4 percentage points, and there is also evidence of a retirement premium,
as retired individuals in this subsample are more likely to volunteer by 10.8 percentage
points. The interaction term is positive and insignificant, indicating that there is no differ-
ential increase in the propensity to volunteer across workers in the two sectors when they
retire. In columns (2) and (3) of Table 6, we add country fixed effects and controls for edu-
cation and occupation and see no difference in the estimated coefficients except for the
fact that, as in the baseline sample, controlling for education and occupation eliminates
the difference between public and private sector. Finally, in column (4), we add individual
fixed effects to account for any individual-specific time-invariant characteristics and find
that the pattern outlined above is robust.
In the introduction, we discussed how the approach of using current employees to iden-
tify differences between the private and public sector in terms of public servicemotivation
is potentially subject to both positive and negative biases related to differences in working
conditions and to differences between marginal and overall motivation. The fact that in
this longitudinal analysis, we see a common shift in the prevalence of volunteering when
Table 6 Longitudinal analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Retired 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.108***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Public 0.044** 0.030* -0.01
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Retired x Public 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Constant 0.141*** 0.108*** 0.253*** 0.163***
(0.012) (0.031) (0.09) (0.006)
Controls Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes
Observations 3,600 3,600 3,520 3,600
Individuals 1,800 1,800 1,760 1,800
R squared 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.06
Notes: Controls include education and occupation.
*** [**] (*) denote significance at 1, [5], (10) % level.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses.
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an individual transitions from employment to retirement suggests that these biases are
either small or cancel each other out. This is consistent with the fact that we obtain a very
similar picture when looking at the workers and at the retirees samples.
5 Results by industry, occupation, tenure, age and country
After having looked at the public sector as a whole, in this section, we conduct some
subsample analysis, disaggregating the public sector into its main industries, looking sep-
arately at the most important professional groups, and exploring heterogeneity along the
tenure, age, and country dimensions. We present this analysis only for the sample of
retirees, where the sample size is larger and therefore subsamples do not get too small. In
any case, the overall message is the same when repeating the analysis for the employees
sample, with the few exceptions noted in the text.
5.1 Industry
So far we have looked at the public sector considered as a whole. We now focus in more
detail at the different key industries of the sector. From Table 7, it emerges that the largest
share of employment in the public sector is concentrated in “Public Administration and
Defence”, accounting for 26% of total employment. Another important component of the
public sector is represented by what can be characterized as “caring” industries, that
is, education (23%) and health and social work (15%). Something that is also evident in
Table 7 is that, of course, the industrial composition of the private sector is very differ-
ent, with a high concentration of workers in manufacturing (37% of the private sector
workforce), followed by wholesale and retail (12%) and construction (11%).
One might hypothesize that there may be differences in prosocial motivation across
industries in the public sector itself. For instance, one might expect that individuals work-
ing in caring industries display higher prosocial inclination, as jobs in these industries
offer more opportunities for engagement in on-the-job prosocial activities. To investi-
gate this, we split the public sector into four groups: education, health and social work,
public administration, and other (includes all other industries). We estimate our baseline
Table 7 Employment by industry and sector - retirees
Industry Private Public Total
Agriculture, hunting 6.7 0.9 4.7
Mining and quarrying 2.1 0.6 1.6
Manufacturing 36.6 2.6 25.0
Electricity, gas and water supply 1.6 3.5 2.2
Construction 10.6 2.0 7.7
Wholesale and retail 11.7 1.7 8.3
Hotels and restaurant 3.0 0.6 2.2
Transport, storage and communication 4.9 11.1 7.0
Financial intermediation 4.6 1.9 3.7
Real estate, renting 4.0 3.4 3.8
Public administration and defence 0.5 25.5 9.0
Education 1.4 22.8 8.7
Health and social work 3.7 15.2 7.6
Other community, social and personal services 8.7 8.2 8.5
Total 100 100 100
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Table 8 Logit regressions - industry
Retirees
(1) (2)
Education 0.144*** 0.052**
(0.023) (0.022)
Health and social work 0.067*** 0.017
(0.021) (0.018)
Public Administration 0.038** -0.014
(0.018) (0.015)
Other 0.033** 0.012
(0.015) (0.014)
Controls No Yes
N 18582 18582
Note: *** [**] (*) denote significance at 1, [5], (10) % level.
All the entries are average marginal effects.
logit regression by adding a set of dummies for whether a public sector retiree reports to
have been last employed in a job in each of these four groups. We report the results of
this estimation with and without controls in Table 8. In the unconditional regression, we
see a positive association between voluntary work and each of the four categories, with
the marginal effects standing at 14.4%, 6.7%, 3.8% and 3.3% for education, health, public
administration and other, respectively. Note that the comparison group here is individu-
als who have retired from jobs in the private sector. When we add the various controls,
as we did in Table 3, the marginal effect of education shrinks to 5.2% but remains signifi-
cant; that of health and social work falls to 1.7% and is insignificant, whereas the marginal
effects of public administration and other industries are also insignificant.
To summarize, this analysis identifies a particular group of public sector workers, those
employed in education, that display a much higher propensity to volunteer compared to
workers in the private sector. Moreover, this difference remains significant even after con-
trolling for personal characteristics. On the other hand, workers in public administration
or in other parts of the public sector are indistinguishable in terms of motivation from
comparable workers in the private sector.
It is worth noticing that in the employees sample, the coefficient for education is close to
zero and insignificant when we add controls, as are the coefficients for the other industry
dummies. This pattern could be an indication that teachers have indeed higher motiva-
tion, but, while at work, they also have the opportunity to behave altruistically on the job
and, thus, do not appear particularly prosocial out of working hours. After retirement,
as they do not have this opportunity anymore, their motivation gets expressed through
volunteering.
5.2 Occupation
One could also expect prosocial motivation in the public sector to be heterogeneous
across occupations. It could be the case, for instance, that due to the compression that
characterizes the wage structure in the public sector (Borjas 2002), in high-skill occupa-
tions, only highly prosocial workers are attracted to the public sector, while in low-skill
occupations, we might even expect “negative” selection in terms of prosocial motivation,
with people willing to “bend the rules” in order to get the relatively lucrative jobs offered
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in the public sector. It is also of specific interest to look at categories like managers or pro-
fessionals separately, as they have a leadership role and a capacity to exert great influence
in the delivery of public services. For these reasons, in Table 9 we estimate Equation 1
for three different occupational groups separately. The first group, “Managers and
Professionals” combines the categories “Managers” and “Professionals” from Table 2. The
second group includes “Technicians or Associate Professionals” and “Clerks”, while the
“Other” includes all the remaining occupational categories10.
The results for managers and professionals, columns (1) and (2), and for the “Other”
category, columns (5) and (6), show a positive and significant differential that becomes
insignificant after adding controls, consistent with the pattern observed for the sample as
a whole. For technicians and clerks, columns (3) and (4), coefficients are closer to zero and
never significant. Thus, all in all, the analysis by occupation shows that the result for the
whole sample is not due to a mixing of positive selection at the top of the skill distribution
combined with negative selection at the bottom, but is rather homogeneous across broad
occupational categories.
5.3 Tenure
It may well be the case that prosocial motivation is not a fixed characteristic, but changes
in the progress of one’s career. In particular, it has been argued that phenomena like
mission-drift or mission-shift may lead workers in the public sector who are initially very
motivated to become disillusioned in the course of their career (Buurman et al. 2012).
Conversely, an individual who is initially relatively unmotivated by social causes may
becomemore sensitive to these issues through the process of socialization to the prosocial
culture that permeates certain public sector institutions.
To investigate these issues, we next examine whether there are differences in prosocial
motivation across former public sector workers depending on their job tenure. The idea
is that, if mission-drift is a major issue, then longer tenure in the public sector may be
associated with lower prosociality. If, instead, socialization is the main driving force, the
opposite would be true. We focus on the subsample of retirees from the public sector and
estimate the impact of having a tenure above the median on our measure of prosociality.
In our sample, the median number of years spent on a public sector job before retirement
is 30 years.
In Table 10 we report the results of a logit regression with and without the usual
controls. In the unconditional regression (column 1), we find a significant 5.4 percent-
age point prosocial motivation premium in the subgroup with longer tenure. When we
add controls, this premium remains positive but decreases in size and is statistically
Table 9 Logit regressions - occupation
Retirees
Managers & professionals Technicians & clerks Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public 0.055** 0.031 0.008 0.000 0.033*** 0.014
(0.025) (0.026) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 3728 3728 5680 5680 9948 9948
Note: *** [**] (*) denote significance at 1, [5], (10) % level. The entries are average marginal effects; standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
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Table 10 Logit regressions - by tenure
Retirees
(1) (2)
Long Tenure 0.054*** 0.025
(0.017) (0.017)
Controls No Yes
N 6362 6362
Notes: All columns include country and survey wave dummies.
Long Tenure is a dummy for having more than 30 years job tenure in the public sector.
The entries are average marginal effects; standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** denotes significance at 1% level.
insignificant. Thus, we do not find evidence that longer tenure in the public sector leads
to depletion of public service motivation. If anything, there is some weak evidence of
prosociality even increasing with tenure.
An obvious limitation of this analysis is that we only know the sector of a retiree’s last
job. Therefore, it could be that some individuals, who we classify as having short public
sector tenure, may have switched jobs within the sector near their retirement, so in fact
they have had a long career in the sector. Nevertheless, we believe it is informative to split
the data in this way.
5.4 Age group
In this section, we check whether there is a cohort effect or time trend in the cross-
sectoral difference in prosociality. In particular, one might postulate that we are more
likely to find differences in prosociality across sectors in the latter cohorts of workers –
who started entering the labor force in the early 60s, a period of rapid economic devel-
opment for many of the countries in our sample – as opposed to the earlier cohorts
who, on average, made career choices just after the second World War. This could be
the case because, with a rapidly expanding private sector providing lots of opportuni-
ties, only very motivated people would choose to pursue a career in the public sector.
To check whether this is indeed the case, we examine whether the results obtained so
far are robust to splitting the sample into two groups by date of birth: those born before
1940 and those born after. This split divides the sample into roughly two equally sized
subgroups.
Table 11 shows unconditional and conditional marginal effects of public sector expe-
rience for the two age groups. The pattern of the coefficients we obtain are very similar
across the two groups and very similar to those obtained for the whole sample in Table 3,
both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. This provides some confidence
that the results reported above are not driven by one particular cohort of workers in our
sample.
5.5 Country
So far, we have conducted the analysis on the pooled sample from the 12 countries under
study. It could be the case that the lack of difference in prosociality that we find in
the conditional regressions is due to the fact that we mix countries where public sector
workers are more prosocially motivated than their private sector counterparts with coun-
tries where public sector workers are more antisocial, for instance, because public sector
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Table 11 Logit regressions - by age group
Retirees
Born before 1940 Born after 1940
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public 0.057*** 0.015 0.063*** 0.008
(0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 9203 9203 10275 10275
Notes: All columns include country and survey wave dummies.
The entries are average marginal effects; standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** denotes significance at 1% level.
employment is a way to extract rents and bribes from the rest of society. To assess whether
the previous analysis masks such types of cross-country heterogeneity, in this section, we
conduct the analysis for each of the 12 countries in our sample separately, with the caveat
that, as evident from Table 1, sample sizes can become rather small.
In Table 12, we report both the unconditional and conditional marginal effect of having
public sector experience. The unconditional marginal effects indicate statistically signif-
icant differences in prosociality across workers in the two sectors in all but 4 countries
(Sweden, Denmark, Greece and Portugal)11. Among the 8 countries where the marginal
effect is significant, we find substantial heterogeneity in the public-private difference in
Table 12 Country-specific logit regressions
Retirees
Unconditional Conditional
marginal effect marginal effect
Austria 0.077*** 0.032**
(0.017) (0.016)
Germany 0.079*** 0.04
(0.026) (0.025)
Sweden 0.03 0.01
(0.021) (0.023)
Netherlands 0.091*** 0.048*
(0.027) (0.028)
Spain 0.046** 0.02
(0.019) (0.018)
Italy 0.072*** -0.01
(0.026) (0.023)
France 0.054** 0.00
(0.024) (0.023)
Denmark 0.04 0.02
(0.024) (0.026)
Greece 0.01 0.01
(0.014) (0.023)
Switzerland 0.047* 0.01
(0.026) (0.025)
Belgium 0.089*** 0.01
(0.022) (0.023)
Portugal 0.04 -0.02
(0.033) (0.025)
Notes: *** [**] (*) denote significance at 1, [5], (10) % level.
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prosocial motivation. In particular, the Netherlands exhibits the largest difference (9.1
percentage points), with Spain exhibiting the smallest (4.6 percentage points). The rank-
ing would of course be very different if we considered the relative difference, given the
high heterogeneity in prosocial motivation across countries documented in Table 1. Once
we control for the various individual characteristics, the marginal effects shrink dra-
matically and become statistically insignificant in all but two countries, Austria and the
Netherlands, where the difference remains at 3.2% and 4.8%, respectively. Among the rest
of the countries, in Germany, the difference across sectors also remains sizeable at 3.6%
but is not precisely estimated, while in the rest of the cases, the marginal effect is even
numerically very close to zero.
Thus, this country-specific analysis is overall consistent with the picture emerging when
we consider the whole sample, indicating that the lack of a differential in motivation
between public and private sector workers is not due to a mixture of countries with posi-
tively selected and negatively selected public employees in terms of prosocial motivation.
6 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we investigate empirically whether public and private sector employees
differ in terms of prosocial motivation using a large sample of elderly and retired work-
ers from 12 European countries. We find significant differences in prosocial motivation
across the two sectors, but, with the exception of the education sector, these are explained
by differences in (former) workers’ education and occupation.
An important limitation of this analysis is that, like most of the literature, we use a
self-reported proxy for public sector motivation, namely volunteering. The survey also
contains information about anothermeasure of social preferences, i.e., whethermost peo-
ple can be trusted or not. Looking at this measure (see the working paper version, Tonin
and Vlassopoulos 2014), we do find similar results, with retirees from the public sector
displaying more trust in unconditional regressions but no difference between the pub-
lic and private sector once controls are included (for employees, the difference is never
significant)12.
Another limitation already mentioned above is that, with the data at hand, it is not
possible to fully assess whether the results are due to the fact that selection of prosocially
motivated individuals into public sector jobs does not take place or whether selection is
active at the recruitment stage, but prosocial motivation dissipates over time and thus
is no longer present at later stages of the career. Our analysis of heterogeneity along the
tenure dimension suggests that this may not be the case, but, as mentioned in Section 5.3,
there are some limitations to this analysis. So, potentially, this could explain the difference
between our results and the ones discussed in the literature review, where a significant
difference between the two sectors is usually found. Other explanations could be related
to the fact that most of these studies do not control for occupation, a variable we have
shown in Section 4.2 to be important in explaining differences in prosocial motivation
across sectors. In addition, some of these studies only consider a subgroup of workers
(workers in the caring sector in Gregg et al. 2011; teachers in Dohmen and Falk 2010)
or find a difference only for a subset of the population, as in Dur and Zoutenbier (2014),
where altruism needs to be combined with confidence in political parties to increase the
likelihood of working in the public sector. Likewise, in our analysis, when we split the
public sector into its main components in Section 5.1, we find that public sector former
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workers in education are more prosocial than comparable workers both in the public and
the private sector. Moreover, as reported in the country-specific analysis in Section 5.5,
the difference in prosociality persists in some countries even after adding controls.
From a policy perspective, if the public sector fails to select workers with public service
motivation, then recruitment policies would need to be modified. Recent evidence (Dal
Bo et al. 2013; Ashraf et al. 2014) shows, for instance, that offering higher compensation
or career prospects is not incompatible with being able to attract pro-socially minded
workers, and further research, particularly in advanced economies, is certainly needed.
On the other hand, if it is the case that the public sector attracts prosocial workers, but
this attitude dissipates over time, then this would have implications, for instance, for the
design of career paths. Namely, closely linking career progression to tenure, as is common
in the public sector in many countries, would effectively mean selecting people lacking in
public service motivation for leadership positions. Moreover, the public sector workforce
in many OECD countries is ageing at an even faster pace than the rest of society due
to the rapid expansion of the workforce from the 1970s until the mid 1980s followed by
stabilization and hiring freezes in the 1980s and 1990s (Pilichowski et al. 2007). If public
service motivation decreases with tenure, it will then progressively become scarcer in the
public sector, with implications for the delivery of public services.
Endnotes
1For a survey of the extensive public administration literature on public service
motivation, see Perry et al. (2010).
2This methodology has been used extensively in the literature that we review in the
next section, using measures like unpaid overtime, charitable donations, volunteering,
blood donations, or participation in nonpolitical civic affairs.
3This paper uses data from SHARE wave 4 release 1.1.1, as of March 28th 2013 or
SHARE wave 1 and 2 release 2.5.0, as of May 24th 2011 or SHARELIFE release 1, as of
November 24th 2010. The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the
European Commission through the 5th Framework Programme (project
QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic programme Quality of Life), through the 6th
Framework Programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE,
CIT5-CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and through the 7th
Framework Programme (SHARE-PREP, No. 211909, SHARE-LEAP, No. 227822 and
SHARE M4, No. 261982). Additional funding from the U.S. National Institute on Aging
(U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, R21 AG025169,
Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG BSR06-11 and OGHA 04-064) and the German Ministry of
Education and Research as well as from various national sources is gratefully
acknowledged (see www.share-project.org for a full list of funding institutions).
4We exclude five Eastern European countries for which the role of the public sector
during socialism was very different fromWestern Europe. We also exclude Israel and
Ireland, both of which have a very small sample size. We cannot use wave 3 of SHARE as
it does not contain the question on volunteering.
5In wave 4, this question refers to the previous year.
6In the Appendix, we report the survey questions behind the main variables used in
the analysis. There is a significant number of individuals with missing values for the
categorical variable on settlement type. So as not to drop these individuals from the
analysis, we assign them to a separate category, “missing”.
7For workers, there are statistically significant differences across the two sectors in all
of the characteristics in Table 2, with the exception of age, couple, limited activities, time
pressure and adequacy of job salary. For retirees, the only exception is gender.
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8Results are very similar when we use a linear probability model.
9Adding to these regressions month of interview as a control for possible seasonal
variation in the likelihood to volunteer does not change the signs, significance or even
the size of the coefficients on the public sector that we report on Table 3.
10Notice that we do not consider the category “Armed forces”, as this category contains
only a few individuals who report to have worked in the private sector.
11Note that of these four countries, two have low percentages of volunteering activity
(Greece and Portugal), while the other two (Sweden and Denmark) have relatively large
percentages of retirees with volunteering activity (over 20%) and very large public
sectors.
12In the working paper version, we also investigate whether employees in the public
and private sectors differ along other dimensions, such as, risk attitudes, political views,
and life satisfaction. We find some evidence of public sector employees being more risk
averse, more left leaning in terms of their political preferences, and more satisfied with
their job and life.
Appendix
Main Variables
Here we report the survey questions behind the main variables used in the analysis.
Prosociality: “Have you done any of these activities in the last month? [For Wave 4:
Which of the activities listed on this card - if any - have you done in the past twelve
months?] Done voluntary or charity work. [...]”
Health status: “For the past six months at least, to what extent have you been limited
because of a health problem in activities people usually do? [Severely limited/ Limited,
but not severely/ Not limited]”
Income: this variable is generated by SHARE through a suitable aggregation of the indi-
vidual and household income components collected in the survey. We use the version
including imputations. Details about themethodology are available on the survey website.
Club:“Have you done any of these activities in the last month? [For Wave 4: Which of the
activities listed on this card - if any - have you done in the past twelve months?] [...] Gone
to a sport, social or other kind of club. [...]”
Time Pressure:“I am under constant time pressure due to a heavy workload. (Would you
say you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?)”
Job Salary Adequate:“Considering all my efforts and achievements, my salary is adequate.
(Would you say you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?)”
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